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Abstract 
Demonstration projects using hydrogen as a fuel are becoming very common.  Often these projects rely 
on project-specific risk evaluations to support project safety decisions.  This is necessary because 
regulations, codes, and standards (hereafter referred to as standards) are just being developed.  This paper 
will review some of the approaches being used in these evolving standards, and techniques which 
demonstration projects can implement to bridge the gap between current requirements and stakeholder 
desires. 
Many of the evolving standards for hydrogen-fuel use performance-based language, which establishes 
minimum performance and safety objectives, as compared with prescriptive-based language that 
prescribes specific design solutions.  This is being done for several reasons including: (1) concern that 
establishing specific design solutions too early will stifle invention, (2) sparse performance data necessary 
to support selection of design approaches, and (3) a risk-adverse public which is unwilling to accept 
losses that were incurred in developing previous prescriptive design standards. 
The evolving standards often contain words such as: “The manufacturer shall implement the measures 
and provide the information necessary to minimize the risk of endangering a person’s safety or health.”  
This typically implies that the manufacturer or project manager must produce and document an acceptable 
level of risk.  If accomplished using comprehensive and systematic process the demonstration project risk 
assessment can ease the transition to widespread commercialization.  An approach to adequately evaluate 
and document the safety risk will be presented. 
Evolving Requirements 
Current efforts to establish appropriate safety levels for the use of hydrogen as a fuel involve many 
technical organizations.  A partial list is presented in Table 1.  More comprehensive lists may be found at 
http://www.fuelcellstandards.com/Matrix.htm and http://hcsp.ansi.org/default.asp.  The standards that are 
being prepared to address hydrogen safety contain a mix of prescriptive and performance-based 
requirements.  Examples prescriptive requirements are: 
• 
• 
For fuel tank connections above 2 inch (5.1 cm) nominal diameter, only welded connections shall be 
acceptable. 
One or more finished fuel tanks shall be drop tested at ambient temperature without developing a 
leakage rate above a defined value. 
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Table 1.--Partial list of organizations involved in the preparation of 
hydrogen safety standards 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) 
American National Standards Institute 
ASTM International 
Compressed Gas Association 
CSA America 
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
International Code Council 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
National Fire Protection Association 
National Hydrogen Association  
Society of Automotive Engineers 
Underwriters Laboratories 
 
Achieving some of the requirements might be considered a technical challenge, but compliance is readily 
apparent.  Performance-based requirements can take the form of: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
“A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) or equivalent reliability analysis intended to identify 
failures which have significant consequences affecting the fuel cell power system safety, shall be 
submitted to the testing agency for evaluation.” (FC 1-2004) 
The device shall be designed and constructed to avoid any reasonably foreseeable risk of fire or 
explosion posed by the hydrogen generator itself or by the gases, liquids, dust, vapours or the other 
substances produced or used by the device. 
Safety Management 
Compliance with performance-based requirements must be done using a well-founded technical approach.  
For many demonstration projects the standards are not fully evolved.  As such it is necessary to 
supplement the existing requirements with risk-based decisions.  There are several techniques that may be 
used to support such decisions, and support performance-based designs.  The US Department of Energy 
(DOE) is addressing the gaps though the development of Safety Plans (DOE 2005), which include: 
Identification Safety Vulnerabilities (ISV).  A formal means to identify potential safety issues 
Risk Mitigation Plan.  A description of the safety performance metrics, safety basis management 
(change control), standard operating procedures, employee training, procedures that ensure equipment 
integrity, and an emergency response plan. 
Communication Plan.  The proposed techniques that will be used to conduct safety reviews during 
design, and incident reporting after operations commence. 
Demonstration project risks include:  safety risk, project risk and fiscal risk.  The three are co-dependent.  
If safety risk is not successfully managed the project might not fulfil the project objectives (project risk) 
or might exceed budget constraints (fiscal risk).  In managing the safely risk a five function process that is 
derived from Integrated Safety Management (ISM) is recommended (DiNunno, 1997).  The five functions 
are illustrated in Figure 1.  The objective of ISM is to systematically integrate safety considerations into 
management and work practices at all levels.  This is accomplished by ensuring work is planned, 
analyzed, revised, approved and executed in a safe manner.  There are five basic Core Functions that 
define how ISM is put into practice. 
2 of 7 
                    WSRC-STI-2007-00042
 Figure 1, Functions of Integrated Safety Management 
Define the Scope of Work.  Translate the facility mission into work.  Set expectations.  Tasks are 
prioritized, and resources are allocated. 
Analyze the Hazards.  Safety hazards and environmental aspects and impacts associated with the work 
activity and work output are identified, analyzed, and categorized. 
Develop and Implement Controls.  Applicable standards and requirements are identified.  Controls to 
prevent/mitigate hazards are identified.  Safety controls are established, communicated, and implemented.  
This process defines the safety envelope. 
Perform Work.  The establishment of the controls is confirmed.  Work is started, performed and 
completed safely. 
Encourage Feedback and Continuous Improvement.  Feedback information is collected and 
opportunities for improvement are identified.  Action Items to effect improvement are tracked and 
implemented.  Oversight is provided to help identify improvement opportunities and enforce 
requirements. 
Analytical Process 
The DOE Guidance for Hydrogen Projects cites a comprehensive approach to hazard analysis as one 
method to conduct the ISV.  This methodology was developed by WSMS in establishing and 
documenting the operational safety of its nuclear and chemical processing facilities.  It has been 
successfully adapted to hydrogen demonstration projects (Coutts, et.al.)  This methodology employs a 
systematic, graded approach and ensures that the greatest attention is applied to the most significant 
concerns.  The steps below summarize the method. 
1. Hazard identification.  The process began by identifying any hazardous material or energy source 
associated with the equipment.  A checklist can be used as a guide to aid in developing a comprehensive 
list of hazards that are characterized in terms of form, quantity, and location.  Table 2 provides an excerpt 
from a project that evaluated the safety of hydrogen-fuel use in a coal mining environment.(Coutts and 
Thomas, 1998)  This is the project that provides the example presented in the DOE Safety Guidance 
Report (DOE 2005). 
2. Scenario development.  The second step in the overview hazard analysis is development of detailed, 
reasonable-worst-case, credible scenarios describing process upsets, human errors, system failures, etc. 
that result in unwanted or unacceptable consequences.  These scenarios are postulated without regard for 
existing design safety features.  (See Figure 2 for an example of how the results from this step can be 
documented.) 
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3. Risk assessment.  The scenarios developed in step 2 are individually assessed to determine (a) 
likelihood of occurrence (expressed as frequency of occurrence per year and defined per Table 3), and (b) 
severity of consequence as defined in Table 4.  This assessment is made by considering both the cause(s) 
of the scenario (or initiating event(s)) and the hazardous material or energy released as a result of the 
scenario.  A sample result from this step is presented in Figure 2.  During this phase of the analysis, no 
credit is taken for preventive or mitigative features in reducing frequency or consequence, thereby 
focusing analysis on the hazards that are of the greatest concern. 
4. Risk binning.  Each hazard is plotted on the frequency/consequence matrix shown in Figure 3. 
5. Graded approach.  Hazards falling in the High and Moderate risk bins are carried forward for 
further analysis.  Low- and negligible-risk hazards are addressed further as management/operational 
issues, but are excluded from further attention in the formal hazard/safety analysis work. 
Table 2.--Example of a hazard iIdentification checklist (partial) 
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Hazard Energy Sources and Materials
 
1. High Voltage (HV).  Voltages above 1000 volts are typically not permitted in the underground environment.  
(There are exceptions for transmission lines.  See the discussion in Coutts, 1998.)  Thus, when the vehicles are 
underground, there is not exposure to these voltages.  If the vehicles exit the mine, there is potential for 
overhead transmission lines that carry these voltages. 
2. Transmission Lines (TL).  There are instances where 4160 or 7200 volt transmission lines have been installed 
in mines.  These insulated conductors have very limited protection from vehicle impact. 
3. Other.  Within the mine there is the potential for exposed conductors, which would be used to support trolley 
lines.  Typically, these systems range from 300 to 600 volts DC. 
4. Exothermic Reactions (ER).  The hydrogen-oxygen reaction in the fuel cell is an exothermic reaction 
5. Other.  Brake disks on mining equipment can get hot and have been known to cause fires. 
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Figure 2, Example hazard evaluation result 
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Table 3.--Frequency criteria used for risk binning 
Acronym Description Frequency level 
A Anticipated, Expected ≤ 1E-02 /yr 
U Unlikely 1E-4 ≤ f < 1E-02 /yr 
EU Extremely Unlikely 1E-6 ≤ f 1E-04 /yr 
BEU Beyond Extremely Unlikely < 1E-06 /yr 
 
 
Table 4.--Consequence criteria used for risk binning 
Consequence Level Impact on Populace Impact on Property/Operations 
High (H) Prompt fatalities, 
Acute injuries - immediately life threatening or 
permanently disabling 
Damage > $1 million 
Vehicle destroyed & surrounding 
property damaged 
Moderate (M) Serious injuries, 
Permanent disabilities, 
Hospitalization required 
$10,000  < damage < $1 million 
Vehicle destroyed 
Minor impact on surroundings 
Low  (L) Minor injuries, 
No permanent disabilities, 
No hospitalization 
Damage < $10,000 
Reparable damage to vehicle, 
Significant operational down-time, 
No impact on surroundings 
Negligible (N) Negligible injuries Minor repairs to vehicle required, 
Minimal operational down-time 
 
 
 
Figure 3, Functions of Integrated Safety Management 
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7 of 7 
Conclusion 
An overview of how the evolving codes and standards will define requirements has been presented.  The 
paper then presents a method that a demonstration project can implement that will satisfactorily 
demonstrate compliance with new performance-based requirements, bridge gaps where existing standards 
don’t provide coverage, and properly manage safety risk.  The techniques, if properly implemented, can 
then reduce both project and fiscal risks.   
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